



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

4 August 1973

*Peter Rodman
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Brent Scowcroft, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Deterioration in Cambodia

1. As we discussed in our 4 August telephone conversation, recent reporting from Phnom Penh indicates that the atmosphere there is steadily worsening.

2. [REDACTED] 25X1

[REDACTED] Sirik Matak is becoming increasingly vocal and 25X1
strident in expressing his dissatisfaction with Lon Nol, whom Sirik accuses
of personally ordering the press ganging of conscripts in order to embarrass
In Tam and General Fernandez. [REDACTED] 25X1

[REDACTED] On 2 August, as reported in the
Phnom Penh Embassy's Exdis telegram 7967 (copy also attached), Son Sann
talked with Charge Enders alleging that the High Council was on the verge of
breaking up and taking the line that both Lon Nol and Sirik Matak had to go.

3. [REDACTED] 25X1

[REDACTED] relays in translation a FANK G-2 analysis of "Perspectives After 25X1
15 August." Though the document represents a commendable effort to face
up to a serious problem, its childlike unrealism is chilling, e.g.

25X1

4. Our Chief of Station's report on his 3 August session with Lon Nol (sent to Dr. Kissinger on 4 August) indicates that Lon Nol is living in a dream world even more than the FANK general staff.

5. None of the omens, in short, are very good and some of them are very bad. As Communist pressure on Phnom Penh increases, even before 15 August, the mood at the top level of the GKR is becoming progressively more unrealistic in some contexts and more poisonous in others. The risk is steadily mounting of some of Lon Nol's High Council colleagues moving to unseat him within the next few weeks, or even days, without giving the U.S. prior warning and in the face of U.S. displeasure. In the present situation -- which Mr. Justice Douglas' ruling, if it is implemented, will further exacerbate -- the GKR could start unravelling at almost any time.

6. The GKR's basic problems -- as has been the case all along -- are ones of leadership, not resources. In the critical sphere of leadership, the U.S. has little room for maneuver, particularly at this time. At a minimum, however, I would respectfully suggest that contingency plans

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should be made, and appropriate instructions issued to our Charge, for the posture the U.S. would take if some of Lon Nol's own colleagues move to oust him with the enemy (almost literally) at the gates. It is also my opinion that in such an eventuality, an attempt to preserve Lon Nol's position in the face of determined opposition from his High Council colleagues -- particularly if the latter should be working in unanimous concert -- would probably be foredoomed to failure.

h a c 2.
George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachments

[redacted]
State Exdis Telegram-Phnom Penh 7967
[redacted]

25X1

25X1